

CLASSIFICATION OF SPEECH ACTS

Solieva Munavvar Ahmadovna*

*Teacher,

English Linguistics Department, Bukhara State University,

Bukhara, UZBEKISTAN

Email id: smunavvar2015@gmail.com

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ABSTRACT

The article discusses speech acts and classification of speech acts, aspects of the analysis of a speech act. It also deals with the five basic kinds of illocutionary acts are: representatives (or assertives), directives, commissives, expressive, and declarations. The theory of speech acts distinguishes three levels, or aspects of the analysis of a speech act. First, a speech act can be viewed as actually saying something. He only gave characteristic examples of such acts - question, answer, informing, assurance, warning, appointment, criticism, etc., noting that each language has its own nomenclature of such actions.

KEYWORDS: *Speech Act, The Communicative Situation, Extra linguistic Purpose, Latin, Speaking*

INTRODUCTION

Since a speech act is a type of action, its analysis uses essentially the same categories that are necessary to characterize and evaluate any action: subject, goal, method, tool, means, result, conditions, success, etc. The subject of speech act - the speaker makes a statement, as a rule, calculated on the perception of it by the addressee - the listener. The utterance acts both as a product of a speech act and as a tool for achieving a specific goal. Depending on the circumstances or the conditions in which the speech act takes place, it can either achieve the goal and thus be successful, or not achieve it. To be successful, a speech act must at least be appropriate. Otherwise, the speaker will face a communicative failure, or a communicative failure.

Analysis:

The conditions that must be met in order for a speech act to be recognized as appropriate are called the conditions for the success of a speech act. So, if a mother says to her son: "Sit down for lessons!", then she thereby performs a speech act, the purpose of which is to induce the addressee to perform the action indicated in the statement used to achieve this goal. If the lessons have not yet been done, if the son is able to do them, and if this is not a duty that he usually performs without any reminders, then this speech act is recognized as appropriate, and in this, communicative, sense, successful. If at least one of the above conditions is not met (the lessons have already been done, or the son is in bed with a high temperature, or he himself, as usual, was going to sit down for lessons), the appropriateness of the mother's speech act may be called into question, and because of this he may be a communication failure. But even if all the conditions

that ensure the relevance of the speech act are met, the result to which it will lead may or may not correspond to the goal set by the speaker. So, in our example, the result of the mother's speech act can be both the consent of the son to perform the specified action, and the refusal to perform it. Refusal at the same time can be both motivated (for example, by the desire to watch your favorite TV show or the fact that there are no lessons) or unmotivated.

Finally, through speaking (in Latin, *per locutio*), a person achieves certain results by making certain changes in the reality around him, in particular and, above all, in the mind of his interlocutor, and the resulting result of a speech action may or may not correspond to that non-verbal the purpose for which it was intended by the speaker. The speech act, considered in the aspect of its real consequences, acts as a perlocutionary act. So, in our example, the mother's statement could, for example, distract her son from a computer game and for this reason cause him dissatisfaction or surprise him (if the mother had already checked the lessons he had learned, but managed to forget about it out of absent-mindedness), or in some other way affect his psyche. The perlocutionary act and the corresponding concept of the perlocutionary effect is that aspect of speech activity that rhetoric has long been engaged in, studying the optimal ways of influencing speech on the thoughts and feelings of the audience.

So, the speech act is a rather complicated phenomenon. The theory of speech acts distinguishes three levels, or aspects of the analysis of a speech act. First, a speech act can be viewed as actually saying something. Considered in this aspect, the speech act acts as a locutionary act (from the Latin *locutio* "speaking"). The locutionary act, in turn, is a complex structure, since it includes both the pronunciation of sounds (the act of phonation), and the use of words, and their linking according to the rules of grammar, and the designation of certain objects with their help (the act of reference), and attributing certain properties and relations to these objects (the act of predication).

Linguistics has for a long time been focused on the study of the locutionary aspect of the speech act. Considering statements regardless of the communicative situation in which they were used, phonetics described their sound side, lexicology - their vocabulary, syntax - the rules for connecting words in a sentence, semantics gave this sentence an interpretation, reducing it to the objective, i.e. devoid of truth value, the content of the judgment expressed by the sentence, in other words, to the propositional content, or proposition, expressed by the sentence.

However, a person, as a rule, does not speak for the sake of the process of speaking: not in order to enjoy the sounds of his own voice, not in order to make a sentence out of words, and not even just in order to mention some objects in the sentence and attribute them to certain properties, thereby reflecting some state of affairs in the world. In the process of speaking (in Latin in *locutio*), a person simultaneously performs some action that has some extralinguistic purpose: he asks or answers, informs, assures or warns, assigns someone to someone, criticizes someone for what something, etc. A speech act, considered from the point of view of its extralinguistic purpose, acts as an illocutionary act. The integral, i.e., generalized and integral characteristic of an utterance as a means of carrying out an illocutionary act, is called the illocutionary function, or illocutionary power of the utterance.

Dissecting the content of the utterance at the illocutionary level of the analysis of the speech act, two main components are distinguished in this content: the illocutionary function (F) and the proposition (P), generally representing it as a formula F(P).

Thus, the content of the utterance in the example considered above is decomposed into the propositional part 'you sit down for lessons' (with the affirmativeness removed, that is, without the truth assessment) and the illocutionary function 'inducement'. The question expressed by the sentence *Are you sitting down to study?* has the same propositional content, but a different illocutionary function, that of a question; meaning of saying I promise.

Thus, the main novelty of the three-level scheme of analysis of speech action described above, proposed by the English philosopher and logician J. Austin, is the concept of an illocutionary act and the corresponding semantic concept of an illocutionary function (force), since they reflect such aspects of the act of speech and the content of the utterance that are not received an adequate description neither in traditional linguistics nor in classical rhetoric. Naturally, it is this aspect of the speech act that is given the main attention in the theory of speech acts.

Research Method and Procedure

J. Austin, who laid the foundations of the theory of speech acts in his Oxford lectures in the second half of the 1950s (they were published posthumously in the form of a book *How to Do Things with Words* in 1962, a Russian translation was published in 1986 under the title *Word as Action* in the 17th release of the publication *New in Foreign Linguistics*), did not give the concept of an illocutionary act a precise definition. He only gave characteristic examples of such acts - question, answer, informing, assurance, warning, appointment, criticism, etc., noting that each language has its own nomenclature of such actions. Later, in the theory of speech acts, the distinctive features of the illocutionary act were revealed: it differs from the locutionary act on the basis of intentionality, i.e., connection with a specific goal, intention, and it is opposed to the perlocutionary act on the basis of conventionality, i.e., the presence of certain rules, the action in accordance with which automatically ensures the successful implementation of this illocutionary act by the speaker. Some of these rules are the rules of the language: in the languages of the world there are special formal means that directly or indirectly indicate the illocutionary function of a speech act.

First of all, there is a special class of sentences that directly expresses the illocutionary function of the utterance that is produced with their help. These are the so-called performative sentences. The basis of the lexico-semantic structure of these sentences is the so-called illocutionary verb, i.e. a verb belonging to a subclass of speaking verbs and containing in its lexical meaning components indicating the purpose of speaking and certain conditions for the implementation of a speech action, for example, ask, congratulate, assure, promise, etc. However, the presence of an illocutionary verb is not a sufficient condition for a sentence to be performative. For this, it is also necessary that the illocutionary verb be used not to describe a certain situation, but in order to clarify what speech act the speaker performs when using this sentence. In other words, the illocutionary verb must be used performatively (and not descriptively).

The semantic specificity of a performative sentence, its difference from an ordinary declarative sentence, is that an ordinary declarative sentence is used to represent a certain state of affairs, i.e., to describe, report, assert, etc., and a performative sentence does not serve to description of the action that the speaker performs, but for the explication of what kind of action he performs. The referent of an ordinary declarative sentence, for example, *I am drawing you*, is some situation that exists independently of the speech act, and the referent of the performative sentence *I greet you* in its normal use is the speech act of its use itself. In short, a performative

utterance has the property of self-referentiality. An ordinary declarative sentence, when used, becomes a statement that can be evaluated as true or false, while performative sentences in the typical context of their use cannot be applied to this kind of evaluation. So, we can say that the sentence I am drawing you will be either true or false depending on the real state of affairs in the context world (cf. possible reactions - Yes, this is really true or No, this is not true: you do not draw, but just drive pencil on paper / you are not drawing me at all), but we cannot say the same about the proposal I greet you. In the normal case of using such a sentence, the question of the truth or falsity of the words of the speaker does not arise. The corresponding statement can only be evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate, but not as true or false. In this connection, one also speaks of the self-verification of performative sentences, i.e., their truth by virtue of the very fact of their use.

The classical form of a performative sentence has a subject expressed by the personal pronoun of the first person singular, and a predicate agreed with it in the form of the indicative mood of the present tense of the active voice. For example, (I) promise you to improve. However, Austin pointed out that performative use is not the exclusive privilege of the sentence model with the verb-predicate in the named form.

In the two properties of an illocutionary act - intentionality and conventionality - lies the contradiction inherent in a speech act between two moments inextricably linked in it: subjective (the goal of the speaker) and objective (independent of the speaker, ways to ensure recognition of this goal by the listener).

So, the main feature of an illocutionary act is its purpose. This does not mean any goal for the achievement of which we perform a speech act, but only one that, in accordance with our intention, should be recognized by the addressee. Only such a goal, open to recognition, is called illocutionary; it, in principle, may not coincide with the true purpose of the speaker. So, wanting to send an annoying guest out and knowing that he is at odds with NN and is unlikely to want to meet him, the host can say: Yesterday NN called and said that he would come in today around nine. The true goal of the speaker - to induce the listener to leave - cannot be considered as the illocutionary goal of his speech act, because it is hidden and it is not at all necessary (and in some cases undesirable) for the addressee to recognize it in order to achieve it. The illocutionary purpose of the speech act in this case will be the purpose of providing the addressee with some information [2,59]. This goal, and in this case only it, is presented openly to be identified as such. Therefore, this speech act at the illocutionary level of analysis will be considered as a message, not an impulse.

Illocutionary acts differ not only in their purpose, but also in a number of other ways. The most famous universal classification of illocutionary acts was built by the American logician and philosopher J. Searle. The basis of this classification is a group of features, which the author himself calls "directions of differences between illocutionary acts." The most significant of them are:

purpose (for example, for a message - to reflect the state of affairs in the world, for an order - to induce the addressee to act, for a promise - to make a commitment, for congratulations - to express a certain emotion of the speaker);

- the direction of the correspondence between the statement and reality (for example, in the case of a message, the statement is brought into line with reality, in the case of an order, on the contrary, reality must be brought into line with the statement);
- The internal state of the speaker (for example, when affirming - the presence of an appropriate opinion, when promising - intentions, when asking - desires, when giving thanks - a feeling of gratitude);
- features of the propositional content of a speech act (for example, in a prediction, the content of a proposition refers to the future tense, and in a report, to the present or past; in a promise, the subject of the proposition is the speaker, and in the request, the listener);
- the connection of a speech act with extra linguistic institutions or institutions (for example, the speech act of appointing someone as one's deputy, usually drawn up in the form of a document, implies the existence of some organization within which the speaker must be endowed with appropriate powers, part of which he is with the help of this speech act endows another member of this organization, compare with similar goals, but institutionally not regulated cases when we ask someone to replace us - to act as our "deputy" - in some unofficial role: to visit our relative in the hospital instead of us, go instead of us to the parent meeting at school, etc.) [3,62].

Given these parameters, the whole set of illocutionary acts was divided by Searle and is divided into five main classes:

The representatives, oriented from reality to the statement, aim to reflect the state of affairs in the world, assume that the speaker has an appropriate opinion, and their propositional content is not limited in any way. Examples of representatives: communication (cf. Chemistry exam scheduled for June 2), condemnation (cf. You are doing wrong), prediction (cf. This conflict will escalate into a full-scale war), qualification (cf. Such actions are a gross violation of the charter), recognition (cf. I've been deceiving you all this time), description (cf. The house is located on top of a hill and surrounded by a magnificent garden).

Directives, with an orientation from statement to reality, aim to induce the addressee to do / not to do something, suggest that the speaker has a corresponding desire, and their propositional content always consists in the fact that the addressee will / will not perform some action in the future. This class includes requests, prohibitions, advice, instructions, appeals and other types of incentive speech acts.

Commissives, oriented, like directives, from the statement to reality, are used by the speaker in order to bind himself with an obligation to do / not do something, suggest that he has a corresponding intention, and their proposition always has the speaker as its subject. Examples of commissions: promise, oath, guarantee.

Expressives aim to express a certain psychological state of the speaker (feeling of gratitude, regret, joy, etc.) as a reaction to the state of affairs defined within the framework of the proposition. The direction of the correspondence between utterance and reality is not essential for them, since the state of affairs that serves as a reason for the expressive (what we congratulate, for which we thank or apologize, etc.) is not the main content, but the premise of such a speech act - his presupposition. The propositional content of the expressive assigns some predicate to the subject, which can be either the speaker (so when we say Sorry for being late!, then we are talking about our own lateness), or the listener (so, when we say Thank you very

much for your help!, then we have in mind the action performed by the addressee of the utterance). The fifth illocutionary class - declarations - differs from the other four in terms of connection with extralinguistic institutions and the specificity of the correspondence between the statement and reality arising from this fact: by declaring (declaring) a certain state of affairs as existing, the speech act of the declaration thereby makes it exist in the real world.

CONCLUSION:

The present study has provided a review of the previous researches on speech act recognition. Speech act theory serves as the theoretical foundation for studies on speech act recognition. Researches generally focus on the automaticity of speech act recognition, illocutionary force indicators and the cognitive functions behind speech act recognition. Detailed analysis about illocutionary force indicators include the context, performative verbs.

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